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Abstract
The news media is among the least-trusted institutions in the nation, with only 41% of Americans
reporting a great deal or fair amount of trust in it (Swift 2017). This is a major change from the highly
trusted media of the mid-20 th Century, although historically this independent, powerful, and widely
respected media establishment is an anomaly. To analyze the causes of media distrust over the last forty
years, I have demographically broken down results from a question asked by the General Social Survey
since 1972. I tested these results, isolated through a regression analysis, against my predictions of
potential sources of media distrust. Among all the factors, only political factors – partisanship and
political ideology – were substantially significant, while age and hours of TV watched showed weak
significance. This did not clearly support any of my predictions but indicates the preeminence of politics
as a determinant of media trust.
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Introduction
A half century ago, the mass media was among the most trusted institutions in
American life, and CBS Evening News Anchor Walter Cronkite was the most trusted
public figure in the nation (Ladd 2012, 1). Gallup surveys taken in the early 1970s
showed that 70% of Americans had a great deal or fair amount of confidence in the press
to report the news fairly. Nearly 50 years later, the picture is strikingly different. The
media is now rated as among the least-trusted institutions in the nation (Gronke and
Cooke 2007), with those same Gallup surveys showing only 41% now have a great deal
or fair amount of trust in the media (Swift 2017).
It is hard to overstate the extent to which public attitudes toward the media have
shifted in the last few decades, or the consequences of that shift for the media itself and
the broader political context. Why the media captured public confidence before – and
why it no longer does now – represent a fundamental unsolved puzzle in American
politics.
One obvious hypothesis is that political actors have long politicized the media. In
particular, Republican elites—Starting with Goldwater and cemented with the Nixon
administration and Edith Efron’s book The News Twisters—have called out the media
for an alleged liberal bias (Hemmer 2016). Not to be outdone, many on the left do the
same, except alleging right-wing, pro-corporate biases (McChesney 2004). So while
Donald Trump—with his shouts of “fake news!” and outrageous tweets—may raise
media criticism to new levels, he is far from sui generis (Ladd 2012).

This politicization of media coverage reflects itself in public opinion data as well.
Those identifying as Republicans or conservatives have, since at least the 1970s,
reported a lower amount of trust in the media, and this gap has widened over time
(Ladd 2012). In September 2016, the Gallup survey reported a low of 32% of
respondents showing a great deal or fair amount of trust in the media, but in 2017 this
recovered to the 40-44% range that was seen every other year for the last ten years. This
recent shift, however, was driven entirely by changes among Democrats: while
Republicans remained extremely distrusting of the media (14% in both years),
Democratic support increased 20 percentage points (51% in 2016 to 72% in 2017).
Further, the 2016 numbers for Democrats were about the same as those in 2015,
whereas in 2015 trust by Republicans were more than double at over 30% (Swift 2017).
A 2017 Pew Research Center report found a similar trend: from February 2016 to March
2017, U.S. adult respondents that expressed “a lot” of trust in news they get from
national news organizations increased from 27% to 34% among Democrats while it fell
from 15% to 11% among Republicans (Barthel and Mitchel 2017).
This disparity highlights the importance of breaking down general trends in
explaining the larger picture. However, the 40-year trend still shows a dramatic decline
for respondents identifying with either (and neither) parties. To explain both the mutual
decline and the partisan split, there must be a factor or factors besides party ID that are
affecting media trust.
The news media has been discussed frequently since the 2016 election of
President Donald Trump. Though he is by no means the first politician to attack the
media, Trump has voiced his opposition to the mainstream media to such a great extent

that the term he popularized - “fake news” – has risen in usage by 365% since 2016 and
was named the Collins Dictionary Word of the Year for 2017 (Hunt 2017). One oftreported factor of the 2016 Presidential election was Donald Trump’s ability to excite
the white working class, a group of lower income and lower educational attainment
Americans, to turn out for him in both the Republican primary and the general election.
These loyal supporters often echoed Trump’s criticisms of the mainstream news media,
with criticisms going beyond partisanship (“liberal” media) to include factors such as
geography and social class (“coastal elite” media).
Does this represent a real change in the demographics of distrust? In the decade
since Gronke and Cooke analyzed how media trust varies by demographic factors, have
these patterns changed? If this were to be the case, our understanding of how and why
the public has lost trust in the media would change dramatically. To narrow the list of
possible causes of loss of confidence in the media as an institution, this paper will
analyze how trust in the media varies by a wide variety of demographic attributes:
education, race, age/birth cohort, sex, frequency of newspaper reading, hours spent
watching TV, general verbal acuity, partisanship, and liberal-conservative selfidentification, more commonly known colloquially as ideology. This is by no means an
exhaustive list of factors that could affect media trust; however, together they cross-cut
the American people in important ways.
In order to frame this discussion in context, I will delve into the historical
background of the American media and its relationship with the public. I will then
examine various theories on the causes of media distrust and make predictions about
what different outcomes in demographic analysis of confidence in the media would

suggest. These results will be tested against a demographic break down of the long-run
media trust trend from the General Social Survey (GSS) and a multivariate regression
analysis of these demographic factors. Finally, I will draw conclusions about the causes
and implications of media distrust from these tests.

Historical Background
Scholars study Americans’ level of confidence in various institutions because this
institutional trust is critical to a well-functioning democracy: “whether citizens judge
politicians or government trustworthy influences whether they become politically active,
how they vote, whether they favor policy or institutional reforms, whether they comply
with political authorities, and whether they trust one another” (Levi and Stoker 2000,
501). The perceived legitimacy of all government and civic institutions in democracies
depend on some level of public trust, but for the media trust is even more central: a
well-trusted media has the power to set national dialogue, shape public perceptions, and
hold governments and public figures accountable. On the other hand, distrust leads to
disbelief, and a media that is entirely disbelieved has no power or function whatsoever.
While there has been a secular decline in trust across all institutions, the media
stands out for the extent of this decline (Gronke and Cooke 2007). Further,
“partisanship and ideology have a weak connection with trust in the government yet
show a strong connection with trust in the news media” (Lee 2010, p. 17). This suggests
that, while they may be contributing factors, causes of general skepticism of antagonism
towards civil and political institutions cannot fully explain modern media distrust.

Explanations must be specific to the media in order to understand it as an institution,
predict future trends and behavior, and offer solutions.
We must view confidence in the media and the media itself in its larger context to
avoid implicitly accepting uncertain assumptions. The Gallup survey quoted in the
introduction asked Americans how confident they were in “mass media” (with examples
given as newspapers, TV, and radio) reporting news “fully, accurately, and fairly.” What
is the “mass media?” When this question was asked in the 1970s, it was synonymous
with the “mainstream” media – news sources aimed at general audiences, with
significant (at least city-wide and especially national) distributions.
The picture today of the mass media is complicated by numerous factors. There is
a more heterogeneous media landscape; whereas in the mid-20 th century Americans got
their news from a local newspaper or one of the 3 major television networks, today
Americans are increasingly likely to get their news from non-mainstream internet
sources (Shearer and Gottfried). Internet sites feature “user-created” content, divorcing
the source from its substance. Social media and news aggregation sites occasionally
distribute articles by small and fringe publications. The line between news, commentary,
and entertainment sources is increasingly blurred as many Americans receive their
information about the news from comedic and satirical sources – 6% of the public and
11% of young adults in 2015 picked The Daily Show with Jon Stewart or The Colbert
Report as their most trusted news source (Gendron 2015) – as well as cable television,
radio, and internet sources that mix news with news commentary. This may lead
Americans to increasingly express more disparate responses regarding their trust in

their preferred news source, the mainstream media, and even overall media
environment.
So why should Americans have confidence in the mass media to report the news
“fully, accurately, and fairly”? How were these values chosen, and why should we
include this in our discussions of confidence in the media? Though often referred to as
the “fourth branch of government,” the media was not planned by a constitution but
rather emerged from various conditions and has taken many roles. The mass media
today is a collection of local, national, and international journalists, news aggregators,
and media corporations. They use nearly all mediums and may have as their mission
private profit, government-endorsed propaganda, public service, or activism. Their
“role,” so far as it can be deduced from their common actions, is to provide information
about current affairs to the public (though perhaps only for paying customers).
It follows that in survey questions such as “How much trust do you have in the
media?” respondents are implicitly being asked how much confidence they have that the
media, as a whole (therefore giving extra weight to mainstream sources), will correctly
inform them on current events. We can therefore see why news reporting should be
accurate (have true information) and full (not misleadingly omitting any facts). In this
sense, we expect the media to do two things: to both take an oath of honesty – to tell the
truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth – and to devote its resources to
uncover important information, in particular, about government.
This leaves us with the third value cited by Gallup: to report the news “fairly.”
What does it mean to be “fair” in reporting news, and why should we care about it? Its
opposite, unfairness, would be characterized by strongly biased coverage of events. Bias

could clearly interfere with the media’s role of informing the public if it were to lead a
journalist make unsubstantiated claims or omit important facts or counterarguments –
but these actions would violate the values of accuracy and fullness as well. In other
cases, a biased report could favor one side and attack or ignore the alternative view yet
still correctly inform the public. If the news is true, what is the harm in unfair reporting?
One answer may be that the best way to ensure that the truth is revealed is for
our information-bearers to adopt a position of epistemic humility, assuming no
knowledge beyond verified facts and leaving further interpretation and speculation to
the public and segregated columnists (the “marketplace of ideas”). Another answer
could posit fairness for fairness’ sake; perhaps the media, as a powerful institution, has
duties both to do its job (inform the public) and to be fair, just as we expect the
government to be fair even if that fairness does not directly contribute to a government
interest. As we shall see, the value of media fairness arose historically from a
combination of economic, technological, and political conditions that gradually created
and then cemented an ideal known as “objectivity.”
Objectivity is a journalistic principle, held throughout the 20 th Century as the
central ethic of Society of Professional Journalists’ Code of Ethics (Mindich 2006, 145).
Deriving from the word “objective,” objectivity seeks to eliminate all subjective bias
from reporting; to present an unbiased account of the news, if such a thing is possible.
Though exact definitions of objectivity are debated, Mindich (2006) argues for five
components of objectivity: detachment, which removes the journalist’s explicit
perspective from the news piece; nonpartisanship, the refrainment from endorsing or
favoring any one side; the “inverted pyramid,” a style of writing that organizes the most

important facts before details in a piece; facticity, or naïve empiricism, a dependence on
facts, with the underlying belief that such facts can accurately explain the world; and
balance, the practice of pairing perspectives on issues with opposing perspectives.
Together, these components attempt to reach fairness by relying almost exclusively on
verified facts, hiding the journalist’s personal perspective, and balancing any accounts of
one side of an issue with opposing views.
Indeed, Mindich even goes so far as to call objectivity the supreme deity of
American journalism (Mindich 2006, 1). Its exalted status in the early-to-mid-20 th
Century embedded it into assumptions for what the media should be, and thus is also
often considered a precondition to media trust. We should not blindly accept it,
however. Why should the media balance its coverage of different sides of an issue? We
want to be informed, but we do not assume that every issue should receive equal
coverage. Could not this balancing run contrary to the media’s main role in correctly
informing the public? For example, if the large majority of scientists agree on one
theory, it may mislead consumers on the state of scientific opinion on the matter to give
the dissenting minority equal coverage. Ida B. Wells, an anti-lynching activist,
frequently corrected the inaccuracies of the objective, balanced coverage of lynching
done by the late 19th Century New York Times. Mindich concludes, “In fact, ‘objectivity’
helped to obscure an important piece of reality, the perceptions of Ida B. Wells and
other African Americans” (2006, p. 113).
Even when objectivity does not take such a radical departure from reality, it is
worth considering whether objectivity among individual sources is important for the
media as a whole. The American legal system functions through combative sides that

present intentionally unbalanced accounts. They cannot lie, but they are incentivized to
come up with any evidence or argument that could benefit their case. This provides the
maximal material for all relevant sides of a case, which a judge or jury could then decide
for themselves. Such a system more closely resembles opposing partisan news sources
than a singular objective media.
Still, expectations that we can trust an individual media source to provide a
complete picture of the world assumes that media sources (especially mainstream ones)
follow this norm of objectivity. Assumptions of objectivity among news sources may
coincide with what Jonathan Ladd calls the “conventional wisdom”: that a trusted, elite,
and professional media is America’s natural state. He argues that contrary to this
perception, however, “the existence of an independent, powerful, widely respected news
media establishment is an historical anomaly” (Ladd 2012, pp. 7-8).
From the 1790s to the 1830s, prominent news agencies were owned and funded
by political parties and groups in government. This party press did not have modern
standards of objectivity, striving instead to unify and mobilize a political base. Initially
this was done by promoting the party line through reasoned arguments, but by Thomas
Jefferson’s presidency the party press often resorted to personal attacks and blatant
partisanship (Kerbel 1999, pp. 29-30). While many interpret the “freedom of the press”
guaranteed by the First Amendment as rule of separation of press and state, Robert
McChesney argues that in the early republic the close relationship between the two was
uncontroversial. Federal and state government printing contracts explicitly subsidized
dominant partisan newspapers, a practice that was not completely ended until the
establishment of the U.S. Government Printing office in 1860. President Jefferson

arranged for printing subsidies for his friend Samuel Harrison Smith to establish the
hugely successful (and expressly Jeffersonian) National Intelligencer, and President
Jackson devoted federal money to the editor of his Washington-based newspaper and
gave political appointments to other editors (McChesney 2004, pp. 27-28).
Starting around the 1830s, technology making publishing newspapers cheaper
and easier, as well as demand for advertising driven by new mass-market goods, led to
the dominance of a competitive commercial press. New publications, called the penny
press because each issue cost one cent (while the party press was six cents), focused on
selling issues through yellow journalism and neutral political coverage for mass
audience appeal (Kerbel 1999, p. 31). This commercially-focused press, which over the
course of the nineteenth century devoted a shrinking portion of its reporting to politics,
received little respect and much hostility from public figures and both far right and far
left political movements (Ladd 2012, pp. 34-36).
Jonathan Ladd attributes the emergence of the “institutional news media” to a
unique environment that allowed large news organizations to become trusted, powerful,
and independent. In the early twentieth century, “competition in the newspaper market
declined at the same time that legal and technological limitations suppressed consumer
choice in the television and radio industry,” while a depolarizing party system
disincentivized political attacks on the media or sponsoring partisan news outlets (Ladd
2012, p. 39). By the 1930s, newspaper circulation grew more than ten-fold from 1880
and 80% of adults reported regularly reading a daily newspaper, all while the number of
newspaper publishers had decreased since 1910 (Ladd 2012, pp. 47-48). The chaotic

competition of the nineteenth century press had changed into an insulated and
increasingly powerful press before the middle of the twentieth century.
Large newspapers became elite, hiring staff writers over freelancers and
expecting reporters and editors to have college degrees and, later, journalism degrees.
The Progressive movement’s values of scientific “objectivity” and area expertise likely
influenced the concurrent rise of the norm of “objective” reporting and the idea of a
“professional” journalist that acts as an expert in sorting and conveying information
(Ladd 2012, p. 43). In addition to objectivity, other codes of conduct unified reporting.
News sections separated from editorials, became dominated by observable and
verifiable data, relied on accepted authoritative sources, and wrote in the “inverted
pyramid” style of news so that a full story could be understood from just the first few
lines of the article. This uniformity was furthered by the regional and even national
news broadcasts made possible by radio and conventionalized by the Big Three
television networks (Ladd 2012, p. 49).
As the media gained power, respect, and independence in the mid-twentieth
century it started to be considered as an institution or even a new, independent political
force, living up to the title “the Fourth Estate.” Media trust was rising as well – in the
1930s, opinions were mixed but generally showed modest trust in the fairness of the
media (an average 1937 Gallup polling showed 47% thought newspapers were fair in
their treatment of political news while 38% said unfair). By the 1960s this trust was
substantial (60-70% trust in network news’ fairness). In a 1970 Roper survey that asked
Americans if their most-watched news anchor colored the news with bias, only 6%
responded that he did while 78% said their anchor reported things “as it happened.” A

famous 1972 poll found that 73% of Americans trusted Walter Cronkite, ahead of the
average senator, governor, President Nixon, or Vice President Agnew (Ladd 2012, pp.
59-64).
While earlier polls did not include demographic breakdowns, the first ones to do
so noted a few interesting differences in media trust among demographic groups. A 1938
Roper Organization poll dataset included presidential preference and occupation, the
latter of which Ladd separated into higher and lower educational occupations. He found
that “Moving from low education to high education decreases the percentage of
respondents saying newspapers are ‘fair and unprejudiced’ from 44% to 33% among
FDR supporters and from 41% to 29% among FDR opponents” (Ladd 2012, pp. 60-61).
A 1956 ANES survey asked Americans whether they felt that newspapers were fair to
both sides of the election: 66% thought newspapers were fair while only 27% thought
they were unfair. Among those who thought they were unfair, 71% thought they favored
Eisenhower and the Republicans but only 10% thought they favored Stevenson and the
Democrats. It included a breakdown by “political awareness,” measured here by 12
objective political knowledge questions, a factor that is highly correlative to higher
educational attainment. Republican faith in the fairness of newspapers ranged only
from 68% to 81% in decreasing political awareness, while an average of 64% of total
Democrats thought newspapers were fair but only 50% of the most politically aware
Democrats did (Ladd 2012, pp. 62-63).
Many describe the 1950s through the 1970s as a sort of golden age for media.
Polls reported high levels of trust in the accuracy, fairness, and alertness of news media
(especially in television news). The media played crucial and largely praised roles in

shifting opinions of the Vietnam War and breaking the Watergate scandal. Yet in the
1980s public opinion started to sour, and by the early 1990s Americans’ growing distrust
of the media attracted academic speculation and debate. The media landscape had
changed so dramatically in two decades that there was no singular obvious culprit. As
President Clinton expressed his anger at the “knee-jerk liberal press,” scholars blamed
the media’s “cynicical view of politicians” (Patterson 1994, p. 245), or an increased
societal cynicism (Kerbel 1999, p. 3). Meanwhile in the early 1990s, the internet
expanded, supplanting cable news’ role as the source for breaking news. Cable news had
to find a new focus for its 24/7 airtime since people were already familiar with the facts
of most news stories, so they turned toward providing analysis, and increasingly
partisan analysis (Levendusky 2013, p. 9).
Since the 1990s, scholarship has usually posited that, to borrow McChesney’s
terminology, “the problem of the media” is either due to: lower quality journalism
resulting from the commercial competition of media corporations (McChesney 2004, p.
17; McChesney 2015, p. 3), the increasingly (and overly) political or partisan nature of
the news (Kerbel 1999), or beliefs among the public but not directly caused by the media
itself (Gunther 1992).
The first theory points to the media’s response to technological and economic
changes. When televisions only had a few nationally broadcast channels, the dominant
cable television networks had less pressure to tailor news presentation for maximized
viewership. The profit motive tamed, television news journalists were free to make what
they considered ‘quality journalism’ – longer, more in-depth pieces on topics that they

thought were the most pressing issues of the day, conforming with their professional
norm of objectivity.
As technological changes allowed more companies to be created and compete
through additional television channels (and later through the internet), news agencies
felt a stronger pressure to constantly expand viewership. This may have led to
sensationalized pieces on hot topics aimed at luring customers in, shorter and simpler
pieces to keep their attention, and possibly a willingness to entertain rather than inform.
The strongest version of this critique argues that there has been a ‘tabloidification’ of the
news: that all news media has become like tabloids, spending more time on frivolous or
“soft” issues like celebrity gossip (including the personal lives of politicians) and making
exaggerated or unsupported claims to grab attention.
Though these tactics may expand viewership, it could be perceived as lowering
the quality of journalism and leading to greater distrust when media companies’ goals of
attracting viewership are viewed as leading audiences to be misinformed or underinformed. In this way media distrust may be viewed as the result of unaligned
incentives: media corporations are ultimately controlled by profit, which may be
maximized by hooking in and entertaining audiences rather than helpfully informing
them (the audiences’ gauge of trustworthiness). This theory would explain why
television news, which was more shielded from competition than newspapers in the
mid-20th Century, received higher levels of trust at that time (Kerbel 1999, pp. 11-14). It
easily explains why Americans of both major political parties have seen a sharp decline
in media trust since the heyday of the Big Three television networks, but has a more
difficult time explaining why Republicans have an increasingly larger distrust of the

media than Democrats. An interesting avenue to research would whether nonprofit
media sources, such as NPR, PBS, and the BBC, have changed their behavior in line with
modern corporate media and the levels of trust in these sources.
The competitive, profit-driven media may be seen as a reoccurrence of the type of
media of the late-19th and early-20th Century; however, there is a twist. While that media
was politically neutral, and later apolitical, the modern media is marked by a strong
political focus, a significant presence of explicitly partisan sources, and possibly a liberal
bias in mainstream news sources – journalists are far more likely to identify as
Democrats than Republicans and Republican identification is less than a third as high
among journalists as it is among the general population (Willnat 2014). Yet media bias
may be argued to be conservative in the sense of maintaining the status quo or may be a
form of “establishmentarianism” (Exoo 1994). Politicization and partisanship in the
media is reminiscent of the media of the early American republic, perhaps even a
“return to its more partisan roots” (Levendusky 2013, p. 8). Importantly, however, this
media partisanship is likely caused by a customer-based profit motive or the political
preferences of media owners or journalists rather than organization by government or
political parties.
The theory that this politicization and/or partisanship is the major cause of
modern media distrust could therefore be argued to be a symptom of the media’s
competitive, commercial pressure; however, those that focus on perceived bias among
the mainstream media may acknowledge the profit incentive of partisan media but
identify partisanship to be the crucial element in media distrust. Some may also argue
that the media is simply reflecting a more divisive, political climate in the U.S. – but that

doing so opens the media to greater distrust (Kerbel 1999). Politicization and bias in the
media fits the trends of overall distrust with greater effect on Republicans but may have
a more difficult time explaining the decreasing media trust prior to the 1990s.
While these former theories leave open the possibility that American’s distrust of
the media is unwarranted, they still explain the trend of distrust as directly resulting
from the actions of the media. Critics of this approach like Albert Gunther, however,
argue that the change has come primarily from the public rather than the media
(Gunther 1992). This argument relies on research that contradicts public perceptions,
such as findings that suggest there is no significant mainstream media bias despite
perceptions that it is increasingly biased.
Media distrust may become a self-fulfilling cycle: when the media was assumed to
be trustworthy, there was little reason to doubt it; after politicians and others
complained of media bias, however, the public may believe it or mistakenly believe that
they have noticed it themselves. This could explain why Republicans have shown a
sharper decrease in media trust – their increasing partisanship – or the expanded
hostility towards the media by Republican politicians – may increase their perception of
media bias. As for the general decrease in media trust, a strong predictor of media
distrust is political cynicism (Lee 2005), so if the public were becoming more cynical
then the media would be less trusted regardless of actual media actions.
The primary observations on which these theories are built are not mutually
exclusive; the modern mainstream media is almost certainly more sensational and less
respecting of privacy of celebrities and politicians, more political and partisan, and
perceived as biased most strongly by partisans (especially conservative ones). These

arguments are also far from exhaustive, and one could mix and match aspects of all
three. Still, they are plausible theories that posit testable phenomena. One method
would be to simply poll Americans on the causes of their trust or distrust of the media,
but this would leave open the debate about whether these complaints relate to actual
media actions or simply respondents’ misperceptions. This unstated knowledge may be
implied, however, in the demographic makeup of responses to general confidence in the
press.
If the cause of media distrust were due to nonpolitical factors such as lower
quality journalism, then we should expect respondents’ political party identification and
ideology to be relatively insignificant. While recent polls suggest that Republicans and
conservatives are more distrustful of the media, if regression analysis shows that this
difference can be explained by other demographic factors then this would support the
first theory. The first theory would also predict that more media-literate Americans
would have lower trust in the media, as they would be most sensitive to a decline in
journalism quality. Older Americans, with direct experience of past, more trustful
media, may have a lower opinion of the modern press.
If media distrust were primarily caused by journalists’ partisan biases or divisive
media politicization, we should expect political identification to be the most significant
demographic factor. Though it would be less significant, media literacy may be
negatively correlated with media trust as one would need to perceive media partisanship
and would be less trustful of the media once they do. Partisan media may inspire
distrust of less partisan media or may be more likely to be consumed by those who are
already less trusting of less partisan media. Since more partisan individuals more often

consume media that caters to their own partisan identities, we may expect that those
who consume more media to be less trustful of media as a whole.
As with the second theory, if media distrust is a result of public misperceptions of
media bias then political identification would be the most significant demographic
factor. Unlike the second theory, however, this theory would expect that media literacy
is positively correlated with media trust because perceptions of media bias are here seen
as a misreading of the media. There are no clear implications in this theory for the effect
of different amounts of media consumption. Since this theory assumes that the media
itself is not the primary cause of changing opinions, media trust should be higher among
older Americans. Older Americans have experienced a media that had higher
perceptions of trustworthiness; if the modern media is in actuality equally trustworthy
then older Americans should maintain their previous original high level of media trust
(unless they themselves became significantly more partisan).

Hypothesis
According to surveys in the late 1990s, complaints that the media does not
respect people’s privacy, ignores errors in their reporting, shows favoritism, is liberal,
puts too much emphasis on negative news, exaggerates problems, and is too sensational
were all held in significantly larger percentages by respondents with higher educational
attainment (Smith and Lichter 1997). These complaints largely focus on the media being
too aggressive in expanding their audience, too unprofessional, and too partisan – all
criticism that one rarely finds lobbed against the main national news organizations of

the mid-20th century. If these are concerns of Americans with high educational
attainment, and they were not pronounced in the mid-century, then they may be factors
in the decline of media trust among this group, a decline that would not be found in the
less-critical lower educational attainment group. This led me to my primary hypothesis,
that the long-term decline in confidence in the media has been driven specifically by the
declining trust of more highly educated Americans.
Certainly a case could be made for the other perspectives as well. Gronke and
Cook (2007) presented a convincing rational for hypothesizing the opposite take:
“Educated people, for example, might be more favorable to the press than to other
institutions, given that they are the beneficiaries of the ‘knowledge gap,’ whereby more
educated consumers of the news are better able to understand and use it to learn about
politics.” (267). I agree that a greater understanding the news would increase the
relevancy of the media to a demographic (although direct appeals at relevancy may
backfire - see “too partisan” and “too aggressive in expanding their audience” above). A
greater desire to use the media to learn about relevant issues, however, may lead to
greater discontent if the actual product does not line up with desires.
Obviously education does not exist in a vacuum; race, sex, age, party
identification, and political philosophy cross-cut these demographics in various ways. It
is therefore necessary to study the changes in media trust among all of these
demographics. For these demographic variables, the groups that were least likely to view
the news media favorably – and most likely to view it unfavorably – were (separately)
whites, younger people, Republicans, and conservatives (Knight Foundation 2018, p. 5).
Sex was not examined in this study, so I will assume it is insignificant. For these groups

to have not declined further than their counterparts would imply that the gap between
counterpart groups was the same or larger, and for instance blacks and liberals would
have nearly unanimously had trust in the media in the 1970s. I therefore predict that the
trend of declining trust in the media can disproportionately be seen among whites,
males, older people, Republicans, and conservatives over the past 40 years.
Additionally, the General Social Survey (GSS), from which I will be drawing my
data, includes other relevant factors: how often respondents read newspapers, how
many hours of TV they watch on average (which may or may not include TV news), and
a measure of their vocabulary (as measured by their defining 10 words of varying
difficulties). A larger consumption of news may give one a stronger opinion on the news
in general, and since general confidence in the media has been lower than 50% for
decades, this would seem to be more likely a negative opinion. Still, those that choose to
consume more news media would likely be those who at least see some value in
following the news. It may also reflect a pre-existing trust in the media. Previous
research has concluded, “Americans who trust the main-stream media tend to consume
it in moderately greater quantities – and are less likely to consume nonmainstream
sources such as internet sources and political talk radio – than those who are skeptical
toward the mainstream media. Still, people consume media for more reasons than
simply to stay informed (such for social or entertainment needs), and even the most
skeptical respondents report significant weekly consumption of mainstream television
news and newspapers” (Tsfati and Capella 2003, pp. 518-519). I thus predict that those
who consume less newspaper or TV media will have less trust in the news.

As vocabulary increases with education, I predict that media trust will be lower
for those with larger vocabularies. This likely indicates a higher media literacy, which
could lead one to find more faults with the media and thus have a lower confidence in it.
This effect will likely be too related to education for it to be included in the regression
analysis. Regardless of the accuracy of my predictions for race, gender, age, party ID,
ideology, frequency of newspaper reading, hours spent watching TV, however, the
results will be synthesized to isolate education in order to test if these two factors are
driving media distrust.

Hypothesis 1: The more highly educated Americans are, the less likely they are to trust
the media
Hypothesis 2: White Americans are less likely to trust the media than nonwhite
Americans.
Hypothesis 3: Younger Americans are less likely to trust the media than older
Americans.
Hypothesis 4: Republicans are less likely to trust the media than Democrats.
Hypothesis 5: Conservatives are less likely to trust the media than liberals.
Hypothesis 6: Sex is not a significant factor in media trust.
Hypothesis 7: Americans who more often read newspapers will have higher media trust.

Hypothesis 8: Americans who watch television more often will have a higher media
trust.
Hypothesis 10: Americans with higher vocabulary quiz scores will have a lower media
trust.

If all of these hypotheses were supported by the data, this would lend credibility
to the second theory on the causes of media distrust. I will thus hypothesize that the
primary cause of media distrust is the politicization and polarization of media sources.

Trends
The General Social Survey (GSS) has been giving Americans the following
question every year or two since 1972: “I am going to name some institutions in this
country. As far as the people running these institutions are concerned, would you say
you have a great deal of confidence, only some confidence, or hardly any confidence at
all in them?” The specification that this trust is in the ‘people running’ these instructions
has been a sticking point for some researchers, but the survey set is nonetheless useful
in tracking the general trend of media (dis)trust (Gronke and Cooke, 2007, p. 263).
Respondents are given a list of institutions, one of which is the “press,” and are
given the following answer choices: “a great deal,” “only some,” “hardly any,” “don't
know,” “no answer,” and “not applicable.” Among the former three, there has been a
gradual, modest decline of “great deal” and “only some” answers and a strong increase

in “hardly any.” All answers, but especially “hardly any,” saw their biggest change in the
early 1990s (figure 1.1).

Figure 1.1

The fact that the phenomenon of decreasing confidence in the media can be
attributed a disappearance of strong supporters of the media and a tripling of those who
have “hardly any” confidence in the institution is an important point – Gronke and Cook
refer to it as “the main story” (2007, p. 264). Still, assuming that those who no longer
had a great deal of confidence in the media instead answered “only some,” and it was
from this pool that the increasingly large “hardly ever” group emerged, the trend is as
gradual as the questions allow. With only three possible affirmative responses to choose

from, even a gradual change could look sudden if enough people passed from one
threshold to another.
Though it is still based off of these unwieldy answers, I have averaged the three
responses into one line to most clearly see the trend of media confidence over the last 45
years (figure 1.2). This average trust can be calculated for demographics to examine
heterogeneous trends across these different sub-groups. In every demographic there
was a clear decline in media trust, but the decline varied among groups. I expected to
notice a slightly larger decrease in trust among whites, and this held true – whites
showed a modestly larger decrease in trust than nonwhites (from a difference of a few
percentage points to around 5%) (figure 1.3). As expected, the difference between the
sexes appears insignificant; the data shows the declines among male and female
respondents as nearly identical (figure 1.4).

Figure 1.2

Figure 1.3

Figure 1.4

Since recent survey results have especially noted that Republicans and
conservatives are more distrustful of the press than Democrats and liberals, I suspected
this gap would be among the largest of all the demographic breakdowns. Though
Republicans and conservatives started with lower media trust than other demographics,
their decline of more than 25% makes them the groups whose trust declined the most.
The gap between those who identify as Democrats and Republicans and between
identifying liberals and conservatives was significant in the 1970s (>5%) but is currently
much larger (>10%) (Figures 1.5 and 1.6, respectively). The large gap that we see today
has been present since the early 2000s, but in the 1990s the gap was quite small. The
media trusts in the respective graphs even converged after a sharp drop in democrats’

and liberals’ trust in the mid-1990s. Since that convergent point Republicans and
conservatives continued on a downward trend while Democrats and liberals have seen a
slight trend of increase in trust, the only such trend in the last forty years.

Figure 1.5

Figure 1.6

Younger Americans have, as suspected, shown the least media trust. As of the
latest surveys, media trust increased with age, with older respondents (ages 60+) being
the most trustful, followed by the those in the middle bracket (ages 35-59) and then
younger respondents (ages 18-34). This has been constantly switching, with the opposite
order in 2008. Still, the gap is for the first time greater than 5% between the most
trustful and least trustful ages, and since younger respondents were the most trustful
age bracket in the 1970s, this shows a large decrease in the media trust of the youngest
Americans (figure 1.7).
It is important to note that the generation of Americans that were in the youngest
age bracket in 1972 joined the oldest age bracket in the last decade. To study how groups

different age groups changed over time, I created five cohorts based on birth year (figure
1.8). Until the mid-1990s, all cohorts fell in tandem, with the youngest cohort in the
1970s (born 1950-1969) starting with slightly higher trust but dropping below the
others. The cohort born 1910-1929 (roughly made up of the G.I. Generation) expressed
slightly less media trust prior to the early 1990s; however, after the drop in this period,
their trust rebounded to nearly their pre-90s levels. Still, since none of these cohorts
consistently deviated from the general age trends, the overall effect of cohorts on age
appears to be insignificant.

Figure 1.7

Figure 1.8

For both the frequency with which respondents read newspapers and the average
hours of TV respondents watches TV, I was correct in predicting that those with less
media exposure had a larger decrease in trust (figure 1.9 and 1.10, respectively). In both
cases the lower-exposure groups were slightly less trustful than their counterparts in the
1970s but have become significantly less trustful since. In vocabulary quiz scores we can
see one of the largest gaps of all demographics when we separate the bottom quartile of
scores from the top quartile and middle 50%. Those with the lowest vocabulary quiz
scores are the most trustful of the media of any group, while both the highest and the
middling scorers showed lower levels of trust (figure 1.11).

Figure 1.9

Figure 1.10

Figure 1.11

Finally, in education I was correct in my prediction that more highly educated
and wealthier Americans would be more distrustful of the media (although whether
these groups are driving media distrust still must be explored). For education, I
separated those with a college degree or more with those with less than a High School
diploma. While these groups had similar levels of trust for the 1970s and 1980s, a gap
appeared after both groups sharply declined in trust in the early 1990s. Those with a
college degree or more dropped 10 points more quickly and has fallen nearly 5 more
points since then, whereas those with less than a high school degree have slowly fallen 5
to 10 points, creating a gap of more than 5% (figure 1.12).

Figure 1.12

Regression Analysis

Education

Partisanship

Male

Caucasian

Ideological Identification

Age

Newspaper Reading Frequency

Amount of TV Watched

Constant

N

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Pooled
Sample

1978

1991

2016

-0.011

-0.003

-0.010

-0.005

(0.001)

(0.003)

(0.005)

(0.004)

-0.015

-0.003

-0.012

-0.015

(-0.001)

(0.005)

(0.008)

(0.006)

-0.005

0.019

-0.007

0.032

(0.005)

(0.017)

(0.029)

(0.021)

0.017

0.041

-0.117

-0.067

(0.006)

(0.028)

(0.042)

(0.025)

-0.021

-0.024

-0.010

-0.034

(0.002)

(0.007)

(0.012)

(0.008)

-0.002

-0.001

-0.001

0.002

(0.000)

(0.001)

(0.001)

(0.001)

-0.033

-0.021

-0.026

-0.007

(0.002)

(0.008)

(0.012)

(0.007)

0.004

0.007

0.005

0.007

(0.001)

(0.004)

(0.007)

(0.004)

0.784

0.658

0.760

0.492

(0.017)

(0.067)

(0.115)

(0.077)

19,363

1,401

502

924

Table 1: Media trust by demographic, isolated.
Note: Cell entries are regression coefficients with associated standard errors in parentheses.
P<0.05

As had been seen in the simple analysis of the GSS, male and female respondents
showed no significant difference in media trust in the regression analysis. Race, age, and
newspaper readership are similarly insignificant when isolated by regression. As
expected, partisanship and political views show a strongly significant difference (with
Republicans and Conservatives showing significantly lower trust, respectively). Both TV
hours and age were statistically significant but substantively insignificant, with both
being positively correlated with trust. Partisanship and ideologies were also the only
factors that increased in relevance from 1991 to 2016.
The substantial difference of partisanship and ideology supports the theories that
media distrust is mainly due to the politicization and partisanship of the media (theory
2) and that it is mainly due to Americans’ misperceptions of partisan bias in the media
(theory 3). It undermines the theory that media distrust is mainly due to sensationalized
and lower-quality news pieces (theory 1). The statistically significant higher trust for
those who watch more television undermines the argument in theory 2 and does not
support or undermine the other theories. The significant positive correlation with age
undermines theory 1 and support theory 3. The fact that no significant difference in
trust was observed based on education undermines theories 1 and 3 but lends support to
theory 2. The lack of significance in other variables does not support or undermine the
theories. The overall results are ambiguous, not clearly supporting any of the three
theories that I tested.

Conclusion
I started this project with a question about what caused the dramatic decline in
media trust over the last four decades. Though, notably, this could be seen as returning
to a norm of media distrust as opposed to a departure from the norm of high media
confidence, it nonetheless represents a substantial and persistent unanswered puzzle in
American politics. In order to find a general framework with which to explain the causes
of media distrust, I grouped explanations into three broad-ranging theories,
representing decades of scholarship on the issue. These three theories each implied
unique differences between demographic groups; if the results were in line with any one
of the set of predictions for each theory, this would support that theory’s claims.
The actual results did not, however, fall cleanly in line with any set of predictions.
The only substantially significant variables were political factors – partisanship and
ideology. The statistical significance of two demographic factors – hours spent watching
TV and age – along with the lack of significance of the other factors do not complement
the partisan results in lending credibility to any of the three theories.
So where do these mixed results leave us in the search for the causes of media
distrust? Clearly political partisanship and ideology are the dominant factors in
determining Americans’ level of confidence in the media. Whether this is primarily due
to a change in the press or the public themselves cannot be established in this study;
however, two aspects of the trends strongly suggest that changes to the public alone
cannot account for the distrust. One of these aspects is that while Republicans and
conservatives have lower, and increasingly lower, trust than Democrats and liberals, the
long-run trend still shows these latter two groups substantially declining in media trust

as well. The other aspect is that, while Americans’ general distrust may be linked with a
growing public cynicism, confidence in the media has declined by a greater amount than
that of other institutions (Gronke and Cooke 2007).
If the media itself must play a part in its reception to the public, future research
could attempt to isolate media activities to analyze responses to individual
characteristics of the media. These characteristics could be as subtle as slightly more
cynical or satirical language or tone or greater acknowledgements of the limits of factfinding. They could be in meta-trends, such as a greater emphasis on “soft” news or
national politics. Perhaps it is in the style of reporting – critics of mainstream media
argue that political issues are done a disservice by “game-framing”: reporting politics
primarily in strategic terms (Lawrence 2000). Or maybe it is the tendency of partisan
and alternative sources to dispute and attack other, especially main-stream, sources.
Simply by talking about bias in the media we may have reified its existence, sowing
skepticism into a medium in which trust was once a given.
Though the causes of media distrust remain an unresolved issue, the implications
of this distrust are hard to miss. A lower trust in the media damages the media’s ability
to inform the public: any news report has a greater chance of being disbelieved and
Americans may instead believe alternative or social media sources to the contrary. The
media’s ability to act as a fact-checker, a whistleblower, and a platform to hold
politicians and other public figures accountable are all severely limited by a great level of
distrust. The presence of investigative journalism is vital to deterring corruption; state
capitals that are far from population centers experience greater corruption, likely due to
a lack of investigative media and consumers of such media (Hasen 2015). While it is

clear that many who have a low level of confidence in the mass media nonetheless
consume it, it is likely that at some level of distrust they will dramatically decrease
consumption, threatening to annihilate the media’s revenue and influence.
This trend is magnified by partisanship. The extremely low media trust among
Republicans and conservatives means that the media will have a tremendous difficulty
in fact-checking, whistleblowing, and holding accountable right-wing groups or GOP
politicians. Attempts to do so may not only be unconvincing among Republicans and
conservatives but also may further turn these groups against the media due to a
perceived bias. If as a result of a high media distrust, Republicans and conservatives
were to drastically reduce their media consumption (or segregate to exclusively partisan
or alternative sources), then mainstream sources will be economically incentivized to
cater to the more Democratic and liberal inclinations of its remaining audience. This
segregated, un-institutionalized media could easily disconnect from norms of
journalistic ethics and accountability – leading exclusive viewers to never learn of major
events that are politically inconvenient, such as investigations of politicians of their own
partisan identification.
More fundamentally, institutions such as the media are only institutions so far as
they play a role in our democratic society. Whether it is perceived as a marketplace of
ideas or a system of democratic deliberation, the conglomeration of speech is what
allows the United States and the world to create and accept the ideas that will define the
future. Though the makeup and characteristics of the media has changed drastically
since the days of the early republic, it still maintains the vital role in informing citizens
that demanded that it be given its own special Constitutional protection: the freedom of

the press. It may not be possible to return to the levels of media confidence of a half
century ago, and if it were to require recreating that landscape it may not even be
desirable, but knowledge of the causes and implications of current media distrust may
nonetheless prove valuable. The media does not simply relay current events: its actions
also are current events, and Americans’ relationship with the media reflects America’s
relationship with itself.
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